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EU State aid draws international attention recent years due to its application to fiscal measures granted 
by Member States to multinational enterprises. It has triggered discussions on the reasonableness of 
applying State aid law to tax measures. This article aims to explore the fundamental rationale behind EU 
State aid and its application to tax incentives. By going back to basics, this article contributes to a clearer 
picture on reasons for the State aid control over tax incentives. Governments tend to use fiscal State aid 
measures to achieve policy goals and tax incentives could realize the goals since they do bring beneficial 
effects. However, considering efficiency and equity in the internal market, tax incentives can cause 
harmful effects as well. It is necessary for State aid law to regulate the harmful effects of tax incentives, 
therefore guaranteeing the level playing field in the internal market. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of an internal market is the ultimate objective of the EU with respect to economic 
activities. The intention of creating the internal market is that a market based economy, open to free trade, 
can best guarantee the welfare of the EU.1 Thus, basic economic theories of a market economy apply to 
the EU internal market. In order to increase efficiency and equity in the market, it is important to create a 
fair competition environment for participants in such a market. Therefore, EU law prohibits Member 
States’ actions that distort competition in the market. 
As a part of EU law, State aid law shares the same object and purpose of the EU at the macro level, 
aiming at creating and safeguarding an internal market. In order to realize the aim of an internal market, 
distortion of competition is forbidden, since, if certain economic participants are favoured unfairly by 
State aid measures, the level playing field may become at risk.2 Therefore, State aid law, as a part of EU 
competition law, is designed to limit the negative effects of State aid and to create a level playing field for 
all Member States. It delivers both the integration and the prosperity objective through ensuring open 
markets and competition on merits.3 
State aid law plays an increasing role in restricting the harmful effects of tax incentives in the internal 
market. State aid control initially presents controversy over its application to tax measures since tax 
measures nowadays normally serve for multiple purposes in the macroeconomic system, not only 
necessarily confined in the domain of competition. However, State aid law catches tax measures if they 
are selective, i.e. discriminate between categories of undertakings.4 In 1997, the European Commission 
adopted a code of conduct for business taxation (Code of Conduct) aiming at improving transparency in 
the tax area through the exchange of information.5 Subsequently, in 1998, the Commission introduced a 
notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation,6 and a 
report on the implementation of the notice in 2004.7 The European Commission has systematically 
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applied State aid law to the regulation of tax incentives.8 With the further development of State aid law 
under the State Aid Action Plan (SAAP)9 and the programme on State aid modernization (SAM),10 the 
application of State aid rules to taxation is evolving as well. In 2016, the European Commission issued a 
notice on the notion of State aid, which provides specific guidance on the identification of tax measures as 
State aid.11 The trend in the EU is to strengthen the functionality of the State aid rules in relation to 
taxation.12 
This article systematically analyses the rationale behind EU State aid’s regulation over tax incentives, 
especially from the perspective of market competition. It first introduces the context for the discussion, 
i.e. the relationship between market, trade and competition. It subsequently describes the concept and 
nature of State aid, and fiscal State aid in particular. Further, it analyses the rationale for granting and 
regulating fiscal State aid. Consequently, it argues the necessity for legally regulating the harmful effects 
of fiscal State aid in the EU. Nevertheless, the article is limited to theoretical analysis on the rational of 
applying EU State aid law to tax incentives, so it does not go deeply into specific cases that has already 
happened in practice. 
2 PREMISE: MARKET, TRADE, AND COMPETITION13 
Before discussing the concept, effects of State aid, and the rationale for disciplining State aid, it is 
necessary to clarify certain terms and the context of the discussion. The starting point is to understand 
market, trade, competition, and the relationship between them.14 
2.1 The market system 
The internal market means the existence of a market. As explained by economists, the market allocates 
scarce resources between competing end users. In a market, there are two major actors: producers and 
consumers. A market system actually describes the actual and potential transactions and decisions about 
production and consumption between producers and consumers.15 In a supranational market, producers 
and consumers from different countries compete with each other through trade. Competition means the 
extent of the actual and potential rivalry between producers for the support of consumers within this 
market in price and non-price terms.16 The relationship between market, trade, and competition can be 
generalized as ‘competition occurs through trade in a market’.17 
The standard for evaluating the functioning of the market is economic efficiency, which refers to the 
optimal use and allocation of resources by the market.18 Based on the theory of welfare economics, the 
ultimate objective of a well-functioning market is to maximize social welfare.19 Social welfare consists of 
two basic elements: efficiency and equity.20 Efficiency means pushing the welfare frontier outward, i.e. 
‘making the cake bigger’, but equity requires moving along the welfare frontier, i.e. ‘dividing the cake 
better’.21 
2.2 Efficiency considerations 
From the perspective of efficiency, social welfare represents the measurement of the welfare gains arising 
from market transactions, which is the aggregate of the net welfare benefit accruing to both producers and 
consumers from the market transactions.22 Under perfect competition,23 an optimal operation of the market 
leads to greater economic efficiency, thereby maximizing social welfare. Furthermore, competition 
enhances efficiency in the market. For producers, competition will stimulate them to minimize the costs 
of production and to explore new products as well, which can result in production efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency. For consumers, the outcome of competition between producers are better products or services, 
lower prices, and broad choices, which embody allocative efficiency.24 
However, in reality, perfect competition in the market is rather rare, whereas imperfect competition is the 
normal status. When the resources cannot be allocated appropriately by the market, market failures 
appear.25 There are several reasons for market failures, such as imperfect competition, public goods, 
externalities, incomplete markets, imperfect information, unemployment, and other macroeconomic 
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disturbances.26 Therefore, economists suggest that government intervention in the market has the potential 
to offset market imperfections and to allocate resources to achieve optimal results.27 They developed the 
Theory of Second Best to depict the effects and risks of government intervention.28 It reveals that 
governmental intervention aimed at correcting market imperfections in one market may cause market 
imperfections in other markets. Thus, governments should only intervene when they can accurately 
identify and address the market imperfections.29 
2.3 Equity considerations 
Another concern arises from the perspective of equity. The economic theory on efficiency proves that 
competition enhances efficiency in the market. Thus, it is necessary to create a level playing field for 
competition.30 However, the concept of equity is not only an economic term, but it also contains legal, 
social, and cultural values, which make it more subjective and distinctive internationally.31 In the context 
of the current discussion on market, trade, and competition, it also refers to the redistribution of social 
welfare to achieve social equity. Distributional fairness is a way to realize justice.32 Following the logic of 
creating fair competition in the market, the starting point here is the equity between producers, i.e. equal 
opportunities for all the producers in the market. The market mechanism itself actually distributes welfare 
between producers and consumers, since competition improves the allocative efficiency of producers. As 
a result, it ensures that producers do not get all the gains of productive efficiency, but it also transfers 
such gains to consumers via reduced prices.33 However, as analysed earlier, the market has imperfections 
meaning that it does not always distribute welfare to the optimal extent. Intervention by the government 
therefore has the objective of achieving distributional equity between producers and consumers. The 
ultimate goal is to distribute welfare among society more fairly, i.e. ‘dividing the cake better’. To 
summarize, the creation of a level playing field for competition aims to achieve efficiency in the market 
as a starting point. The objective can be to realize distributional equity for all the participants in the 
market with respect to social welfare. Nevertheless, there are always trade-offs between efficiency and 
equity depending on different governments’ social and economic objectives.34 
In summary, the relationship between market, trade, and competition serves as the foundation to further 
understand State aid. The premise for the discussion of State aid is the existence of the market system, 
liberalized trade, and competition in the market.35 Moreover, market, trade, and competition are dynamic 
processes. This means that the economic analysis of State aid is not static. 
 
3 CONCEPT AND NATURE OF STATE AID 
3.1 Legal concept of State aid 
From a legal perspective, a State aid means any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources 
in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods and shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the internal market.36 
3.2 Nature of State aid 
3.2[a] Governmental Intervention into the Economy via Fiscal Revenue 
Under a market economy system, State aid is the governmental use of fiscal revenue to intervene the 
economy.37 State aid is funded from tax revenue paid by taxpayers, which can involve direct and indirect 
budgetary costs through forgone tax revenues. Therefore, the provision of State aid is a redistribution of 
national income.38 
 
 4 
 
 
3.2[b] Instruments to Achieve Governmental Objectives 
Governments grant State aid. From a government’s perspective, State aid is an instrument used to achieve 
certain social or economic goals, such as adjusting resource allocation, boosting the economy, attracting 
investment, and improving equality.39 There is a distinction between general aid and specific aid. 
Governments are free to offer general aid to industries, but, in reality, governments often grant aid to 
specialized sectors or activities. Specific aid reflects a government’s particular objectives to support 
certain industries or regions.40 
 
4 STATE AID IN THE FORM OF TAX INCENTIVES 
4.1 Concept of tax incentives 
The concept of tax incentives is vague, but it has certain features. A common element in the notion is that 
there is a deviation from a benchmark tax system.41 In the context of international trade, tax incentives 
normally target economic development.42 They can be considered as a transfer of government revenue 
that is achieved by reducing tax obligations based on a benchmark tax system.43 It does not require a 
direct grant of cash that may become a burden on fiscal expenditure. By using tax incentives, tax that 
otherwise would be due is foregone in the end.44 
4.2 Reasons for governments using tax incentives as State aid 
4.2[a] Efficiency 
Governments prefer to use tax incentives rather than direct subsidy instruments because they consider tax 
incentives to be more efficient than direct subsidies. At the stage of legislation, it is possible to grant tax 
incentives faster compared to granting direct subsidies. The source of the financing of subsidies is tax 
revenue and subsidies are granted through the redistribution of national income. To grant direct subsidies, 
it always requires a budgetary scrutiny procedure. In fact, it becomes more and more difficult for 
governments to get approval for subsidy programs, especially in a period of a budget crunch or financial 
crisis.45 Hence, by providing subsidies through tax incentives, the government does not have to go through 
an independent and time-consuming budgetary scrutiny procedure.46 Although the lawmaking process 
itself may require a formal and complicated procedure as well, once it is stipulated in the tax legislation, 
the provision of tax incentives can be direct and efficient.47 
At the stage of implementation, tax administrators are experts on tax issues, and they are well trained and 
fast to take action. Governments always trust tax administrations can achieve their policy goals by 
administering the implementation of tax incentives. The automatic implementation of tax incentives also 
results in efficient enforcement, since governments do not have to set up a special institution to carry out 
and supervise the subsidy programs. However, governments often overestimate the capability of tax 
administrations, thus overly relying on them to implement very technical and complex tax incentives. In 
such situations, tax administrations are overloaded and lack concrete guidance to perform. Since 
tax administrations have limitations as well, the efficiency of the tax incentives can be affected.48 
4.2[b] Flexibility 
Another reason that governments prefer to use tax incentives is that they believe tax incentives are more 
flexible than direct subsidies.49 For the recipients of tax incentives, there are various forms and levels of 
tax incentives that can be used individually or combined, thereby allowing individuals or firms to 
determine how much the particular activity is to be supported and how to maximize the benefits derived 
from using these instruments. Furthermore, taxpayers themselves can decide how to apply tax incentives 
to fit their interests best. In addition, payments to beneficiaries through the tax system are automatic, 
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which seems more simplified for them.50 Nevertheless, the so-called flexibility is not always flexible once 
tax incentives are stipulated in the legislation, as it is more difficult to alter tax laws than direct subsidy 
programs. The amendment of tax laws always has to go through the legislative process, while changing a 
direct subsidy program could take place within the government.51 
4.2[c] Transparency 
To a certain degree, tax incentives can be considered less transparent than direct subsidies, and therefore, 
for governments, tax incentives might be less debated or investigated.52 Direct subsidies are always 
controlled by a special entity in the government, thereby resulting in a higher administrative authority. 
This administrative entity can ensure stricter supervision of the outgoing capital for both the government 
and the beneficiaries.53 With regard to the tax incentives, they do not always go through the supervision 
process required for direct subsidies. For instance, direct subsidies always target particular subjects 
providing a specific preferential treatment, however, a tax incentive, for instance, might appear to apply 
in general to all subjects, but de facto it may only benefit certain taxpayers. The latter is obviously less 
transparent than direct subsidy programs, and this kind of tax incentive is regarded as a disguised subsidy. 
With the development of globalization, especially in the context of international trade, direct subsidies 
can easily be considered to be trade barriers, and therefore governments are gradually abolishing direct 
subsidy programs and creating more tax incentives to achieve certain objectives.54 
However, it is not always the case that direct subsidies are more transparent than tax incentives, because, 
if tax incentives are to be stipulated in tax laws, the launch of new laws and the amendment of previous 
laws have to go through a formal and complicated procedure as well. This exposure can increase the 
transparency of new tax incentives. 
 
5 RATIONALE FOR GRANTING FISCAL STATE AID 
5.1 Efficiency rationale 
5.1[a] Correcting Market Failures 
Tax incentives are an instrument used by governments to influence the market. Governments always find 
justifications for granting tax incentives namely as correcting market failures. 
Firstly, tax incentives can reallocate resources properly.55 One form of market failure is an imbalance 
between demand and supply, i.e. the amount of goods and services on the market outweighs the 
consumption ability or vice versa. In this situation, tax incentives can adjust the imbalances by 
stimulating the production when there is short supply or by controlling the production in oversupply. 
Secondly, governments can sponsor investments in industries that require large amounts of money and in 
which private enterprises usually will not invest.56 It is especially important to subsidize activities such as 
employment, research and development (R&D) development, and the protection of environment, etc. In 
addition, the public goods that the market cannot provide can also be offered through governmental 
subsidization. 
The ultimate goal of correcting market failures is to increase domestic market efficiency. Governments 
adopt tax incentives to improve domestic market efficiency, which contributes to the country’s 
competitiveness in foreign markets.57 For example, when domestic efficiency has improved, domestic 
enterprises tend to export, especially when there is over capacity in the domestic market. 
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5.1[b] Supporting Infant Industry 
Granting protective tax incentives to domestic infant industries can help start-ups to take the time to grow 
stronger.58 Tax incentives may reduce their costs of production and stimulate them to expand production 
or to make decisions to enter or exit a market. With the increase of their production, infant industries can 
even grow faster than mature competitors. To a certain degree, without tax incentives, a producer may not 
expand its production because it would not be profitable. However, when other conditions remain the 
same, a tax incentive may make it profitable for the producer to invest in new production or to invest in 
foreign markets.59 In the long run, this kind of aid will assist domestic producers to participate more and 
even enjoy a beneficial status in foreign markets. 
It is obviously beneficial for governments because they appreciate the associated outcome derived from 
the growth of those infant industries, such as technology transfer, increase of employment, and 
improvement of core competences, etc.60 
5.1[c] Strategic Trade Theory 
Strategic trade theory analyses subsidies according to the maximization of national welfare. (61) Because of 
imperfect competition in the international market, many industries gain significant profits. Using 
subsidies, governments can encourage resources flowing to certain domestic sectors, thereby increasing 
the strategic advantages in those sectors and shifting those international profits to domestic firms, 
consequently increasing domestic income.62 
From a dynamic analysis, domestic tax incentives may have the objective effect of reducing the net costs 
of production, which could also stimulate the exportation of those products. As a result, the expansion of 
exports can assist the domestic producers to accumulate capital, improve technology, accumulate 
resources, and accordingly improve the overall welfare.63 
5.2 Equity rationale 
Tax incentives not only can improve efficiency in the market, but they can also readjust inequities. They 
work as instruments for governments to redistribute social welfare and adjust inequalities. For example, 
private investors are rarely willing to invest in underdeveloped regions without preferential incentives 
such as regional tax incentives, since it is difficult to generate revenues in such regions, compared to 
investing in developed regions where the market and resources are better. However, if governments can 
offer tax incentives for investment in those underdeveloped regions, the situation may be changed. Also, 
as a method redistributing national income, the use of tax incentives can support the establishment of 
public infrastructure and services and reduce inequity between different regions.64 
 
6 RATIONALE FOR REGULATING FISCAL STATE AID 
Economics is in flux. Although governments claim the beneficial effects of tax incentives as reasons for 
granting them, the actual effects can be contradictory. Therefore, the alleged benefits can turn into harms 
or negative effects. The following sections demonstrate that the alleged benefits mentioned above are 
likely to be harmful for other market participants or even for the governments themselves. By analysing 
the adverse effects of tax incentives, it is much clearer to assess fiscal State aid and the rationale for 
regulating them. 
  
 7 
 
 
6.1 Efficiency rationale 
6.1[a] Distortion Caused by Correcting Market Failures 
6.1[a][i] Distortion of Resource Allocation 
Tax incentives can artificially change the comparative advantage of a country, producing an inefficient 
allocation of resources.65 In a country’s domestic market, for instance, if a government provides a tax 
incentive to the producer of a certain good, the incentive reduces the cost of production. However, 
resources are employed to produce selected goods rather than other goods of greater value. As a result, 
such resources are not allocated most efficiently, since they are not allocated to their most productive use. 
Moreover, in the international market, tax incentives, especially export-oriented incentives, divert 
resource allocation in the importing country’s market.66 Thus, tax incentives reduce global welfare by 
promoting the production of goods in one country that another country could have produced more 
efficiently, leading to lower economic welfare worldwide. From this perspective, tax incentives are 
assumed to ‘tilt the playing field’ as opposed to maintain a ‘level playing field’.67 
6.1[a][ii] Distortion Effects on Third Countries 
Products with export incentives to a foreign country not only affect the importing country itself, but they 
also influence other countries in the internal market. (68) For example, Country A exports to Country B, 
meanwhile, Country C also exports to Country B. When Country A provides tax incentives to its 
domestic enterprises exporting to Country B, Country B can take countermeasures towards Country A 
when encountering distortion and a reduction of welfare to counteract the subsidy influence caused by 
Country A. However, as a competitor of Country A, Country C cannot compete with Country A’s 
enterprises. As a result, the enterprises of Country C may exit from Country B’s market. Consequently, 
Country C’s producers will encounter losses that cannot be compensated by Country B’s 
countermeasures.69 Hence, fiscal State aid can create new market failures in another market or just 
transfer those failures to other countries. As a whole, they do not solve the problem, but they can create 
new distortions and welfare losses. 
6.1[a][iii] Governmental Failures 
The decisions of governments may bring about detrimental outcomes. Usually, when private choices face 
failures, they are easily adjusted since the scale is always small; however, public choices by governments 
are more difficult to change or abandon if the scale is large and the effects are concentrated in certain 
sectors or activities.70 Once the effects of fiscal State aid cannot be controlled well, the distortion and 
social welfare losses may be more severe than the original market failures. 
In addition, government intervention is costly and its administrative costs may exceed the benefits of 
correcting the market failures.71 The decision can also be taken on misinformation if regulators have less 
information than market participants have. Above all, governments are in principle as self-interested as 
market participants are, and therefore they might be more concerned with maximizing their private utility 
than the welfare of whole society.72 Therefore, the efficient correction of market failures actually depends 
on the correction cost. 
Furthermore, excessive government intervention can also trigger political lobbying and corruption that 
may easily cause power rent-seeking.73 For example, interest groups can influence governments to adopt 
their suggestions on tax incentives, which mainly represent their interests developed via lobbying and 
financial sponsorship. Consequently, the use of tax incentives for certain sectors or activities is not always 
based on the consideration of social welfare or domestic efficiency, but instead, it is affected by special 
interest groups. On the other hand, the lobbying of related interest groups can also easily result in 
corruption.74 Therefore, the results of governmental failures can be more severe than market failures. 
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6.1[b] Side Effects of Supporting Infant Industries 
As analysed before, tax incentives can help start-ups to learn and grow more quickly. However, infant 
industries may eventually grow into mature industries, and they can enjoy a more advantageous 
competition status in the domestic market with continuous State aid.75 Moreover, State aid protect infant 
industries from pressure from competition in the market, and cause them to lack the motive to 
innovate.76 In this situation, the extreme case could be that enterprises would be more reliant on 
governmental support, resulting in enterprises that otherwise would be out of the market continue to be 
able to stay on the market. This is an artificially caused deviation from market rules, which means that, 
once subsidies are cancelled, those enterprises may end up in a worse-off situation.77 
Tax incentives can also result in protectionism. In the long run, infant industries with tax incentives are 
likely to form monopolies in the market and make domestic consumers worse off.78 Provided that other 
conditions on the market do not alter, in this case, other competitors may gradually leave the market or be 
left with only a small share of the market. Hence, the subsidized producers are likely to be able to 
manipulate the price of products, thereby affecting customers’ welfare.79 However, this situation appears 
only under the assumption that the tax incentive is the only variant that affects the market position of 
enterprises, while other variants stay stable. In reality, this situation rarely exists, but the role tax 
incentives play should not be neglected.80 
6.1[c] Strategic Trade Policy Leading to Game Theory 
Tax incentives granted in the name of strategic trade policies can turn into a prisoner’s dilemma, (81) which 
makes both subsidized and unsubsidized parties worse off (see Table 1).82 
Table 1 83 
 No Tax Incentive Tax Incentive 
Country B 400 500 
No tax incentive 400 50 
Country A 
Tax incentive 
50 
500 
100 
100 
 
In the situation of tax incentives as export subsidies, domestic products can enter a foreign market with 
lower prices, which may benefit foreign consumers in general. Nevertheless, foreign local producers may 
have an opposite attitude, because they encounter unfair competition. Without the same subsidization, 
local competitors cannot afford to have prices of products as low as the subsidized imported products; 
consequently, they may exit the market.84 However, in the long run, tax incentives as export subsidies can 
still damage the consumers’ welfare since, when competitors exit the market, there is an increasing 
dependence on subsidized imported products and the producers are subsequently able to act as 
monopolies.85 In this case, subsidies can be used as a form of predatory competition, i.e. the prices of the 
subsidized products are very low so that other competitors in the market would not be able to compete.86 
From a dynamic perspective, the strategic trade policy not only damages the country who grants the aid 
but it also distorts competition and results in a reduction of global welfare. What is worse, if there is no 
control of the use of tax incentives, more and more countries would be involved in upgrading the 
incentive-granting competition, which can eventually make all the participants worse off and impair 
global welfare. 
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6.2 Equity rationale 
Despite that the objective of tax incentives is to remove inequality between individuals, enterprises, and 
regions, the effect or the result can be unequal. This is because tax incentives are not granted to all but 
only to a selected group of individuals or enterprises. The selective nature means that it has to distinguish 
between different potential recipients. Indeed, the selected groups might originally be in a 
disadvantageous position and the aid just help to readjust their impartial position. However, tax incentives 
could also result in a new situation of inequality. 
Tax incentives for specific regions can lead to regional tax competition.87 Governments provide tax 
incentives in less-developed regions with the purpose of attracting investment to the regions that could 
bring more capital, technology, and employment, etc. However, even within a country, different regions 
compete on a horizontal level, and this is especially the case in federal countries. States launch various tax 
incentives to draw investment and resources. Regions that have the government’s support are likely to be 
better off. In the long run, if they continue to enjoy those incentives, the level playing field is tilted again. 
In order to compete with these regions, other regions have to grant more tax incentives, which may end up 
with the worst situation in a prisoner’s dilemma. 
In addition, most tax incentives aim at the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the domestic 
market, thus offering preferential treatment to foreign enterprises. Nevertheless, this action harms the 
equity between domestic and foreign enterprises. Foreign enterprises are able to enjoy public goods 
without contributing significantly to their financing through corporate tax, but domestic enterprises who 
do not have access to those incentives must pay for the revenue loss resulting from the incentives to those 
foreign enterprises. This situation eventually distorts the fair competition between domestic and foreign 
enterprises.88 
Furthermore, although governments intend to use tax incentives to improve equality, it is critical to 
analyse who is the real beneficiary. From the government’s point of view, tax incentives are aimed at the 
taxpayers, and particularly the high-income taxpayers. They provide most benefits to wealthy taxpayers 
and non-taxpayers do not benefit. Only eligible taxpayers can benefit from those tax incentives; this 
upside-down effect can cause the same problem as unequal treatment.89 
 
7 LEGAL REGULATION OF FISCAL STATE AID IN THE EU 
7.1 Regulating the harmful effects of tax incentives 
Due to the potential harmful effects of tax incentives in the context of international trade and competition, 
it is necessary to regulate the use of tax incentives. Economics is in flux, which means that a tax incentive 
granted with the objective to increase efficiency or equity in the market can still bring adverse effects to 
the market, trade, and competition. 
The rules of fiscal State aid actually aims at their regulation of the harmful effects. When determining the 
regulation of the harmful effects, normally there are three situations: the tax incentive generates benefits 
and brings little or no harm; the tax incentive leads to harm, but balancing the harm with the benefits, the 
harm is affordable since the overall benefits are higher; harm caused by the tax incentive outweighs the 
benefits. The regulation interferes more in the latter two situations when the harm caused by the tax 
incentives substantially affects trade and competition in the market and further damages economic 
efficiency and equity. 
However, how to identify harmful effects is an essential issue for the State aid control. The current case 
law in the EU implicates that the understanding of selectivity of fiscal aid still has vagueness, complexity, 
and uncertainty.90 This leads to more potential conflicts in the practice for Member States when carrying 
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out tax incentives. Therefore, it is necessary to improve on the methodology of identifying the selectivity 
of fiscal State aid in order to achieve the goal of regulating their harmful effects. 
7.2 Legal regulation based on the rule of law 
Regulation here means legal rules, which imposes restrictions on governmental behaviours. The market 
economy is actually a rule of law economy.91 The key feature of the market economy is private 
ownership, i.e. resources are owned by private individuals. It makes both trading parties better 
off.92 Economic interest is very important for individuals and personal choice is the basis of transactions. 
Thus, the proper functioning of the market requires a guarantee of effective laws and institutions that 
restrain the discretionary power of governments. The rule of law provides the basic guarantee that has 
replaced the social order of human relationships. In order to limit the harmful effects of tax incentives, 
governments should be subject to the rule of law. 
The rule of law is a very broad and intensive concept, which reflects different values in different social 
circumstances.93 However, it is commonly acknowledged that the threshold conditions of the rule of law 
are to restrain the arbitrary and inequitable use of state power and to protect individual rights.94 In an 
economic context, a government’s behaviour is regulated by the rule of law which ensures efficiency in 
the market, since it entails freedom of entry into the market, access to relevant information, and the 
security of contracts.95 Based on the basic theory of public finance, in the field of taxation, governments 
should confine the main economic functions to the stabilization of economic activity, redistribution of 
income and wealth, and the allocation of resources, so that the market still functions as the major actor in 
allocating resources.96 A rule-based system can increase the transparency and accountability of 
governments and minimize the harmful effects caused by government intervention into the market.97 In 
order to control the harmful effects of tax incentives, the legal regulation normally entails both ex-ante 
and ex-post assessment.98 Ex-ante assessment means that, before introducing a tax incentive, governments 
should estimate the effects of the incentive according to certain legal and economic criteria. Ex-post 
assessment refers to the termination of tax incentives after periodical reviews on their effects. If there is 
no renewal, they should be terminated. 
7.3 Supranational regulation in the EU 
Considering the cross-border effects of tax incentives, it is important to determine the supranational 
regulation of those incentives at the EU level.99 In the internal market, one Member State’s tax incentives 
affect other Member States’ status of competition on the international market. Regardless of which 
justification is given for granting tax incentives, they can all lead to distortions in other Member States. 
Particularly, in the specific context of tax competition, the abuse of tax incentives becomes an cross-
border issue that requires cross-border regulations.100 The race to the bottom is a typical example which 
results from harmful tax competition. Therefore, based on the benchmark of promoting economic 
efficiency and equity in the internal market, it is necessary to regulate the harmful cross-border effects of 
tax incentives. 
Additionally, one country’s domestic interest groups have less chances to influence the rules and 
institutions on the EU level, and therefore the EU regulations create rather a fair platform for 
competition.101 This serves the equity objective in relation to the regulation of tax incentives, which 
reduces governmental failures that usually occur domestically. 
 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
Governments use tax incentives as State aid to achieve different objectives, such as correcting market 
failures, supporting infant industries, stimulating exportation, attracting FDI, and improving equality. 
Indeed, they play a role in realizing these goals and bring with them beneficial effects, which become the 
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main reasons for governments to employ such instruments. However, economics is constantly in flux. The 
analysis on effects of tax incentives also demonstrates harmful effects with respect to efficiency and 
equity in the market. The alleged benefits pursued by governments can nevertheless cause disadvantages. 
Tax incentives aiming at correcting market failures can cause worse welfare loss and new failures; tax 
incentives targeting at supporting infant industries can prompt them into becoming monopolists in the 
market; export tax incentives could trigger tax competition and the situation of racing to the bottom that 
everyone ends up poorer; tax incentives with the purpose of improving equity can actually be 
discriminatory. Therefore, it is also essential to control the use of tax incentives as State aid. 
In the internal market, the benchmarks to evaluate State aid are efficiency and equity in the market, which 
are the starting points for conducting trading activities. In order to prevent these harmful effects, it is 
necessary to regulate the use of tax incentives, which should mainly be in the form of legal regulation. 
Furthermore, the regulation should normally entail the ex-ante and ex-post assessment of tax incentives. 
Moreover, considering the transnational effects of tax incentives, it is necessary to regulate the use of 
these incentives within the legal framework of the EU State aid law. 
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